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Changing the Rules of the Game: The





Scarcely an election campaign occurs today, at any level of
government, in which the candidates do not debate each other.
It is immaterial whether debates actually help voters make in-
formed choices among the candidates or whether the skills in-
volved in debates are relevant to effective service in office.'
The widespread perception that candidates are expected to de-
bate insures that debates will be held and that the contenders
will be judged on their performance.2 Outstanding perform-
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1. It should be noted that there is substantial disagreement over whether polit-
ical debates are useful in helping voters make informed judgments. See, e.g., Presi-
dential Debates: The Gap Between Issues and Answers, 31 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan.
1980, at 20 (study of debates in 1976 and 1980 found that debate participants only
spend five to ten percent of their time on issues of true concern to the voters); Kirk-
patrick, Presidential Candidate Debates: What Can We Learn From 1960?, in THE
PAST AND FUTURE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES 46-50 (A. Ranney ed. 1979) (describing
criticism of debates as placing inordinate emphasis on appearance and personality);
Chaffee, Presidential Debates: Are They Helpful to Voters?, 45 COMM. MONOGRAPHS
328 (1978) (questioning value of political debates). The issue of whether political de-
bates are useful is especially important because the new FCC policy is based on the
assumption that an increase in debates would benefit the public. See infra text ac-
companying note 29.
2. For example, debates between presidential candidates were virtually un-
known prior to 1960. The famous Lincoln-Douglas debates were not part of their pres-
idential campaign in 1860, but rather occurred in 1858 during their battle for election
to the Senate. See S. SIGELSCHIFFER, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE: THE DRAMA OF
THE LINCOLN-DOuGLAS DEBATES 438 (1973). Debates have occurred between the pres-
idential candidates in the last three elections, between Carter and Ford in 1976, be-
tween Carter and Reagan in 1980, and between Mondale and Reagan in 1984. Debates
now are an expected part of political campaigns.
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 7
ance in political debates can provide a tremendous boost to
campaigns, while a gaffe can be a fatal blow to a candidate's
election hopes.3
Until recently, Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
rules virtually prohibited radio or television stations from spon-
soring debates. Under a long-standing policy, a station could
broadcast a political debate as a news event, and thereby avoid
the costly obligation of providing equal time to every fringe
candidate, only if someone else sponsored the debate.4 The
practical effect of this rule was to make the League of Women
Voters the most frequent sponsor of debates, which television
and radio stations then broadcast.'
In November 1983, the FCC revised its rules to permit sta-
tions to sponsor the debates themselves without any obligation
to provide equal time to all candidates in an election. Thus,
stations can now arrange and hold debates in their studios, us-
ing their personnel, and need not invite all of the candidates in
an election to participate. In March 1984, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld
3. Professor Austin Ranney, commenting on the 1960 and 1976 debates, ob-
served, "Both debate series had major impacts on the election's outcomes, and some
analysts say they were decisive." Ranney, Preface to THE PAST AND FUTURE OF PRESI-
DENTIAL DEBATES 1 (A. Ranney ed. 1979). Many political scientists have stated that
they believe the Kennedy-Nixon debates were decisive in the 1960 election. See, e.g.,
N. POLSBY & A. WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN
ELECTORAL POLITICS 178 (1976). Similarly, many believe that the debates, and espe-
cially President Ford's misstatement that Poland was not under Soviet domination,
were decisive in 1976. See, e.g., J. WITCOVER, MARATHON 644 (1977) (quoting Jimmy
Carter: "[I]f it hadn't been for the debates I would have lost.").
4. See In re Petitions of Henry Geller and the National Association of Broadcast-
ers and the Radio-Television News Directors Association to Change Commission In-
terpretation of Certain Subsections of the Communications Act, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,166,
53,169 (Nov. 25, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Petitions of Henry Geller] ("For purposes
of Section 315(a)(4), the Commission currently requires a broadcast debate, among
other things, to be sponsored and controlled by a third party not associated with the
licensee."). See also M. FRANKLIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 822
(2d ed. 1982) ("Debates are now exempt if they are controlled by someone other than
the candidates or the broadcaster.").
5. For example, the League of Women Voters arranged and sponsored the de-
bates in the 1976 and 1980 political campaigns. M. FRANKLIN, supra note 4, at 823;
Friedenburg, Selfish Interests of the Prerequisites for Political Debate: An Analysis of
the 1980 Presidential Debate and Its Implications for Future Campaigns, 18 J. AM.
FORENSICS A. 91, 97 (1981) (importance of the League of Women Voters in arranging
the 1976 debates).
6. The new rule is that "broadcast of a debate between legally qualified candi-
dates may be within the section 315(a)(4) exemption, even if the debate is sponsored
by the broadcaster." Petitions of Henry Geller, supra note 4, at 53,167.
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the legality of the new FCC rules in a short per curiam
opinion.7
The old policy was repealed in the spirit of deregulation.
There is little indication that much thought was given to the
practical effects of the revised rules.' The purpose of this arti-
cle is to consider how the new FCC regulations will affect the
conduct of election campaigns. At the outset, it should be noted
that these predictions are written from two perspectives. In ad-
dition to having taught media law, I served as Harold Washing-
ton's Debate Manager in his campaign for mayor of Chicago. In
this role, I represented Congressman Washington in negotia-
tions with potential debate sponsors and representatives of the
other candidates. In Chicago, three different media organiza-
tions were directly involved in arranging and sponsoring the
debates, contributing to a highly publicized dispute among the
candidates concerning the existence and nature of the debates.9
The experiences of this political campaign, although occurring
prior to the change in FCC rules, provide evidence of the poten-
tial effects of the new regulations.
After describing how the FCC has dramatically changed the
law, this article will suggest three major consequences of the
new policy. First, allowing broadcast stations to stage debates
7. League of Women Voters v. FCC, No. 83-2194 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 8, 1984).
8. The FCC's discussion of the new rule contains only one sentence as to its
likely effect, an assertion that the rule will cause an increase in the number of polit-
ical debates. Petitions of Henry Geller, supra note 4, at 53,169. See also infra text
accompanying note 29.
9. Two broadcast stations were involved in sponsoring debates in Chicago in ap-
parent violation of the existing FCC rules. WBMX, a radio station, invited the candi-
dates to appear at a debate it was sponsoring and did, in fact, sponsor a debate.
WTTW, a public television station, invited representatives of the candidates and the
League of Women Voters to a meeting in its offices to try to arrange debates. The
first two negotiation sessions were held in WTTW offices. After that, WTTW's repre-
sentatives suggested that further meetings be held in the League's offices to avoid the
appearance of WTTW sponsorship. Thus, the Chicago experience is indicative of what
is likely to occur under the new FCC policy because in the 1983 Chicago primary
campaign the old rules were violated and broadcasters sponsored debates.
The third media company to offer to sponsor a debate was the Chicago Sun-Times.
Additionally, a number of other civic groups, most notably, the League of Women
Voters, the Civic Club, the local chapter of the Urban League, and the Fraternal Or-
der of Police extended invitations for debates. In large part, the large number of invi-
tations to sponsor debates resulted from strong dissatisfaction with the manner in
which the League of Women Voters handled the debates in the Illinois gubernatorial
election campaign that had just concluded. Potential sponsors repeatedly refused to
co-sponsor a debate with the League, pointing to the poor handling of the earlier de-
bates. Thus, the Chicago primary represents a rare instance in which the League's
role as sponsor was questioned.
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will proliferate the number of sponsors and make negotiations
over debate formats a major issue in many political campaigns.
Second, the new regulations risk serious conflicts of interest as
stations both sponsor debates and report on the events in ar-
ranging and conducting them. Third, permitting broadcast
licensees to sponsor debates without inviting all of the candi-
dates in an election to participate will perpetuate, and possibly
increase, discrimination against third party candidates.
II
The Law Concerning Sponsorship and Broadcast
of Political Debates
The Communications Act of 1934 imposed a duty on broad-
cast licensees to provide equal time to all candidates in an elec-
tion. Section 315(a) provided:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally quali-
fied candidate for any public office to use a broadcast station,
he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates
for that office in the use of such broadcasting station: Provided,
That such licensees shall have no power of censorship over the
material broadcast under the provisions of this section. No ob-
ligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow the use of its
station by any such candidate.10
This provision was intended to prevent favoritism by broadcast
stations in selling or donating time or in scheduling political
broadcasts."
For almost twenty-five years, the FCC interpreted the equal
time requirements as inapplicable to newscasts, concluding that
such coverage of a candidate did not constitute "use" of the
broadcast facilities. 2 In 1959, however, the FCC reversed itself
and held that the equal time requirements of Section 315(a) do
apply to news programs and news events broadcast by the sta-
10. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
11. The equal time rules have existed since the very first congressional regulation
of broadcasting, the Radio Act of 1927. Section 18 of the Radio Act became, with little
modification, Section 315 of the 1934 Communications Act. The Radio Act and the
original version of Section 315 "established a principle of absolute equality for com-
peting political candidates in the 'use' of broadcast facilities." In re Petitions of the
Aspen Institute Program on Communications and Society and CBS, Inc. For Revision
or Clarification of Commission Rulings under Section 315(a)(2) and 315(a)(4), 55
F.C.C.2d 697, para. 7 (1975).
12. Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 351-52 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 890
(1976).
[Vol. 7
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tion.'3 This ruling was strongly criticized because it was feared
that application of the equal time requirements to newscasts
"would tend to dry up meaningful radio and television coverage
of political campaigns."' 4 If every mention of a candidate in a
news program triggered equal time obligations, stations might
substantially reduce their coverage of election campaigns.' 5
Thus, in 1959, Congress quickly amended Section 315(a) to
overturn the FCC's decision. The 1959 amendment provided
that the equal time rule did not apply to the:
Appearance of a legally qualified candidate on any:
1) bona fide newscast;
2) bona fide news interview;
3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candi-
date is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects
covered by news documentary);
4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but
not limited to political conventions and activities incidental
thereto).'16
There is nothing in the legislative history of this revision indi-
cating whether Congress intended political debates to consti-
tute "a bona fide newscast" or "on-the-spot coverage of bona
fide news events.'
17
The issue of whether campaign debates are exempt from
equal time rules did not arise in 1960, the first election after the
statutory revision, because Congress enacted legislation sus-
pending Section 315 insofar as it applied to debates between
presidential or vice-presidential candidates in that year.18 Con-
gress enacted this temporary exemption because the FCC had
13. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. & Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 26 F.C.C. 715 (1959).
This case also involved a primary election for Mayor of Chicago. Lar Daly, a fringe
candidate running in both the Democratic and Republican primaries, claimed that he
deserved time in newscasts equal to that provided to the other candidates in both
primaries. The FCC agreed.
14. S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1959), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
AND ADMIN. NEWS 2564, 2572, quoted in Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 352 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
15. Zapple, Historic Evolution of Section 315, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF POLIT-
ICAL DEBATES 57 (A. Ranney ed. 1979) ("The ruling had a crippling effect on broad-
cast journalism. It required a broadcaster who devoted one minute to a legally
qualified candidate participating in any program... to make available a minute of
time to every other legally qualified candidate for the same office.").
16. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982).
17. Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 363 ("We are thus unable to discover from the extensive,
if rather ambiguous, legislative history any conclusive indication of a Congressional
intent with respect to candidates debates and press conferences.").
18. 86 Stat. 677 (1960).
COMM/ENT L. J.
not yet issued rules interpreting the amended version of Sec-
tion 315.19 However, in the next election year, 1962, the FCC
ruled in two separate cases that the broadcast of a political de-
bate was not exempt from the equal time rules. 20 In other
words, if a station broadcast a debate, regardless of the sponsor,
the station was then obligated to provide equal time to all of the
candidates not invited to participate in the debate. The effect
of these rulings was to "effectively exclude all debates from the
Section 315(a)(4) exemption."
'21
This policy continued until 1975, when, in response to peti-
tions from both the Aspen Institute Program on Communica-
tion and Society and CBS, Inc., the FCC reversed its two 1962
decisions. In what is known as the Aspen decision, the Com-
mission ruled that stations could broadcast debates without in-
curring equal time obligations provided that they are bona fide
news events.22 To qualify as a bona fide news event, the debate
must be "sponsored and controlled by a third party not associ-
ated with the licensees."2 3 In Chisholm v. FCC,24 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit up-
held these new FCC rules, concluding that in light of the am-
biguous legislative history, the court should defer to the
agency's interpretation of congressional intent.
In the years following the Aspen rule and the Chisholm deci-
sion, debates sponsored by the League of Women Voters be-
came common. For example, in both the 1976 and 1980
presidential campaigns, the League sponsored nationally broad-
cast debates between the candidates.25 Similarly, at the state
and local levels, political debates frequently have been spon-
19. S. REP. No. 1539, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960); 106 CONG. REC. 13,424 (1960)
(remarks of Senator Pastore), quoted in Aspen Institute Program on Communication,
55 F.C.C.2d 697, para. 26 (1975).
20. National Broadcasting Co. (Wyckoff), 40 F.C.C. 370 (1962) (holding that a de-
bate held at the U.P.I. convention between candidates in California's gubernatorial
election did not qualify as a bona fide news event); The Good Will Station, Inc.
(WJR), 40 F.C.C. 362 (1962) (holding that a radio broadcast of a debate between the
leading candidates in Michigan's gubernatorial election, sponsored by the Detroit Eco-
nomic Club, was not a bona fide news event).
21. Chisholm, 538 F.2d at 353.
22. Aspen Institute Program on Communication, 55 F.C.C.2d 697, para. 40 (1975).
23. Petitions of Henry Geller, supra note 4, at 53,169.
24. 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
25. In 1976, the League of Women Voters sponsored debates between both the
presidential and the vice-presidential candidates. See J. WITCOVER, supra note 3, at
612, 613-15. In 1980, the League sponsored a debate between Democratic candidate
Jimmy Carter and Republican candidate Ronald Reagan and also a debate between
[Vol. 7
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sored by the League of Women Voters.26
In November 1983, in response to a petition by Henry Geller
and the National Association of Broadcasters, the FCC over-
turned its Aspen ruling and held that broadcast stations may
sponsor political debates without providing equal time to candi-
dates not included in the debate .2  The FCC's new rule was
accompanied by a statement in the Federal Register that ex-
plained why the Commission believed broadcast station spon-
sorship of debates to be consistent with the legislative history
of Section 315.28 The Commission, however, did not explain
why it was reversing itself, stating only that it believed "ex-
empting broadcaster sponsored debates should serve to in-
crease the number of such events, which would ultimately
benefit the public."29 No discussion or elaboration followed this
assertion. °
In March 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit issued a short per curiam opinion
upholding the new FCC ruling. 1 The court explained that it
felt obligated to defer to the Commission's expertise in light of
its earlier decision in Chisholm v. FCC,32 which held that defer-
ence in this area is appropriate due to the ambiguous legislative
history.3
Ronald Reagan and John Anderson, a third party candidate. President Carter refused
to participate in the latter debate. Friedenburg, supra note 5, at 92.
26. For example, in Illinois, the League of Women Voters sponsored a series of
debates between the Democratic and Republican candidates for Governor in 1982. In
a number of instances, the broadcast of a debate sponsored by the League of Women
Voters that excluded certain candidates was challenged before the FCC. See, e.g., In
re Socialist Workers Campaign, 88 F.C.C.2d 349 (1981) (debate between candidates
broadcast from television studio does not lose exemption because of location of debate,
if broadcaster has no control over debate); In re Donato, 66 F.C.C.2d 599 (1977) (re-
broadcast of debate, two and a half days after it occurred, is not exempt from equal
time requirements); In re Delaware Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d 1030 (1976) (a debate
which is taped and rebroadcast more than one day after it is held is not exempt from
the equal time rules).
27. Petitions of Henry Geller, supra note 4, at 53,167.
28. Id. at 53,169-70.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. League of Women Voters v. FCC, No. 83-2194 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 8, 1984).
32. 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
33. The D.C. Circuit's entire ruling consisted of four short paragraphs. The first
stated the procedural posture of the case and that "[tihe issues presented have been
fully considered by the court; they occasion no need for an opinion." The second sim-
ply said, "Disposition of this case is controlled by this court's decision in Chisholm v.
FCC [citation omitted]. The Commission's action is a legitimate exercise of its discre-
tion." The third and fourth paragraphs of the ruling announced that the court was
COMM/ENT L. J.
Traditionally, broadcasters have refused to sponsor debates
in an effort to avoid the costs of providing equal time to every
candidate in an election. Now, for the first time, the FCC has
exempted all debates from Section 315 and will allow stations
to sponsor them without incurring equal time obligations.
III
Analyzing the Effects of the New FCC Policy
Professor Stephen Gottlieb observed that "the legal rules
surrounding debate acquire enormous significance involving
both how they encourage and how they structure debate."
34
Thus, it is useful to consider what will be the likely effects of
the new FCC policy. I foresee three major ways in which the
new regulations will alter the conduct of political campaigns.
First, allowing broadcast stations to sponsor debates will pro-
liferate the number of sponsors and make negotiations over de-
bate formats a major issue in many political campaigns.
Typically, under the old FCC rules, there was no dispute over
who would sponsor the debates. In most cases, the League of
Women Voters invited the candidates to debate and there was
little disagreement as to how the debates would be conducted. 5
The candidates met with representatives of the sponsor and the
debate was arranged. It was rare for other organizations to try
to compete with the League of Women Voters' sponsorship.
The new FCC regulations virtually insure that in every con-
tested election there will be a dramatic increase in the number
of potential sponsors. Television and radio stations have many
incentives to sponsor debates. A station receives publicity and
advertising by holding a debate in its studio. Also, broadcast
stations can use their anchorpersons and reporters as modera-
tors and panelists, providing them additional exposure, which
might be useful in attracting new viewers and listeners. In the
first few months of the campaign for the Democratic presiden-
tial nomination, many debates were sponsored by broadcast sta-
affirming the FCC rule and delaying implementation of the rule for seven days to
allow for a petition for rehearing. League of Women Voters v. FCC, No. 83-2194 (D.C.
Cir. filed Mar. 8, 1984).
34. Gottlieb, The Role of Law in the Broadcast of Political Debates, 37 FED. B.J. 1
(Winter 1978).
35. For example, in 1980, the League of Women Voters invited the presidential
candidates to participate in political debates, and the total negotiations to arrange the
debates, took only six hours. Friedenburg, supra note 5, at 96.
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tions and staffed with their personnel. For example, in Illinois,
both the local CBS and NBC affiliates offered to sponsor de-
bates, and a debate was held in the CBS studios with panelists
drawn entirely from the ranks of local CBS reporters. Like-
wise, in New York a number of media stations offered to spon-
sor debates, with the debate ultimately held in the CBS studios
and moderated by the network's top anchor, Dan Rather.
What will dramatically increasing the number of potential
debate sponsors in an election campaign mean? Although
political debate formats seem basically alike, there are an al-
most endless number of details over which candidates might
disagree.3 6 For example, in the Chicago Democratic mayoral
primary, the three candidates disagreed as to the number of de-
bates that should be held, their location, their topics, when they
should be held, who should ask the questions, who should mod-
erate, their length and their format. If there is just one poten-
tial sponsor, the negotiations are much simpler than if there
are many. The greater the number of potential sponsors the
more likely it is that each candidate will accept a different invi-
tation and then try to negotiate for the arrangement that will
be most favorable. This is exactly what happened in Chicago,
where the candidates accepted different invitations and then
engaged in protracted, highly publicized negotiations over the
arrangements. 7
The likely effect of the FCC's new rules, as illustrated in Chi-
cago, is to make negotiations over the debate format an in-
dependent controversy in the political campaign. Media
coverage of the negotiations makes the debate over the debates
a campaign issue and a separate basis for analyzing candidates.
For example, each candidate hopes, above all, to convey the im-
pression that he or she has triumphed in the negotiations and
has won major concessions from opposing candidates as to the
nature of the format. No candidate wants to look like he or she
lost the debate over the debates. In part, this reflects a general
desire to be perceived as more effective and competent than his
or her opponents. Additionally, because negotiations are an im-
36. See Pfau, Criteria and Format to Optimize Political Debates: An Analysis of
South Dakota's 'Election '80'Series, 19 J. AM. FORENSICS A. 205 (1983) (discussing the
importance of decisions over the format); T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT,
1960, at 283 (1961) (discussing disagreement over the number of debates to hold;
Nixon favored one debate and Kennedy wanted five).
37. Withdrawal Threats Endanger Debates, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 11, 1983, § 2, at 1,
col. 2.
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portant aspect of many public offices, a candidate does not want
to appear to lack basic bargaining skills.
Thus, in the Chicago primary campaign, one candidate,
State's Attorney Richard Daley, withdrew from the initial
agreement over the debates when the media conveyed the
sense that he had made concessions to the other candidates, in-
cumbent Jane Byrne and Congressman Harold Washington.38
Similarly, after a new agreement was reached, Congressman
Washington's staff decided to pull out of the debates because it
felt that the campaign had not appeared sufficiently strong in
press coverage of the negotiations, and it seemed that Daley
had won major concessions.39 In internal discussions within the
campaign, there was continued concern over whether the can-
didate would "look tough" in press coverage of the bargaining.
I believe that the candidates' desires to win the negotiations
will mean not only that behavior in the negotiations will be a
campaign issue, but also that some debates will never be held
because disagreements over details will remain unresolved. It
is easy to imagine situations in which the candidates' public po-
sitions as to how the debates should be conducted will place
them in situations where compromise is perceived to be impos-
sible. Further, a candidate who really doesn't want to debate
can feign a sincere desire to do so, yet blame the absence of
debates on a challenger's stubborn refusal to compromise on
the format. As political commentator Robert MacNeil has re-
marked, "[T]he skillful campaign manager needs a technique
38. After the two initial negotiation sessions, representatives of the three candi-
dates had agreed to a series of four debates; three of the debates were to be focused on
specific issues, one would allow questions on any topic. All were to be held in prime
time. The agreement was reached on December 22, 1982. On December 29, represent-
atives of State's Attorney Daley indicated that they were no longer willing to partici-
pate in the agreed upon series of four debates, and had instead accepted three other
invitations for debates.
39. The new agreement called for four debates, but only the first two would in-
clude all of the candidates. Congressman Washington and Mayor Byrne had decided
to go ahead with the last two debates even if State's Attorney Daley did not partici-
pate. This agreement was reached on December 30, 1982. On January 10, 1983, repre-
sentatives of Congressman Washington and Mayor Byrne informed the scheduled
sponsor of the first debate (the Chicago Sun-Times) that they would not participate
unless State's Attorney Daley adhered to his initial agreement to participate in all
four debates. Daley refused and the Sun-Times announced that it was cancelling the
debate.
It should be disclosed that I resigned as Washington's Debate Manager when the
decision was made to withdraw from the agreement. Washington Debate Aide Quits,
Chi. Sun-Times, Jan. 12, 1983, at 3. Ultimately three debates were held among the
candidates.
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for keeping the candidate out of debates that might be harmful
and at the same time not lose face."40 Disagreements in the
negotiations provide precisely the opportunity for candidates to
avoid debating, while still appearing willing to participate.
Furthermore, the negotiations over the debates will provide a
new tool for communicating with important constituencies.
For example, in Chicago, Harold Washington's core constitu-
ency was the black community. Thus, his representatives de-
manded that some of the debates be held in black communities
and that a black person moderate at least one of the debates.
Likewise, one of Washington's major campaign issues was revi-
talizing the neighborhoods in Chicago. Hence, he wanted de-
bates to be held in community settings. Although the location
of a televised debate is obviously only symbolic, it is a symbol
that can be used to transmit a message. For similar reasons,
Washington accepted an invitation extended by a radio station
that appeals primarily to a black audience.
Other candidates in the Chicago debate negotiations also
used the negotiations to communicate messages. For example,
State's Attorney Daley's campaign emphasized crime-related
issues. Hence, he alone accepted an invitation extended for a
debate to be sponsored by the Fraternal Order of Police. The
incumbent, Jane Byrne, wanted to demonstrate her commit-
ment to the neighborhoods and therefore initially argued for
sixteen debates to be held in communities throughout the
city.
41
Obviously, the debate negotiations cannot be used to commu-
nicate with constituents if they are conducted in secret. It is
probable, however, that most negotiations will be highly publi-
cized. Candidates will likely see the bargaining as an opportu-
nity to obtain free publicity, both of the candidate and of his or
her key issues. Also, candidates can use publicity during the
negotiations to force opponents to stick to the terms of agree-
ments. If tentative agreements are disclosed to the news me-
dia, there will be significant pressure on candiates to adhere to
them.4
40. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting R. MACNEIL, THE PEOPLE MACHINE:
THE INFLUENCE OF TELEVISION ON AMERICAN POLITICS 174-75 (1968)).
41. Candidates Haggle over Format Details, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 12, 1983, § 2, at 1,
col. 4.
42. In fact, one lesson candidates might draw from the Chicago experience where
agreements were repeatedly broken, is that the media can be used to help insure ad-
herence to tentative agreements. In hindsight, one of the major errors made by the
COMM/ENT L. J.
In short, broadcast stations' sponsorship of debates will
greatly increase the number of invitations for debates, insuring
that negotiations must occur to decide when, where, and how
debates will take place. The result will be to make debate ne-
gotiations an issue that clever candidates will manipulate to
their advantage.
A second major aspect of the change in the FCC rules will be
the difficulties arising from the fact that the same broadcast
stations that sponsor the debates will also report on events dur-
ing the election campaign. There is a clear role conflict when
media companies are involved both in trying to arrange debates
and in reporting on the progress of the negotiations. Broadcast
stations may very well provide-or appear to provide-prefer-
ential coverage to those candidates who accept their invitations
to debate. Moreover, the station is in a difficult position if its
behavior during negotiations becomes a campaign issue. Imag-
ine a situation in which a station's refusal to compromise as to
the format prevents a debate from occurring. The station can
hardly provide disinterested reporting when its own actions are
in question. Similarly, if the station's reporters' conduct dur-
ing the debate becomes an issue, the station will be in a compro-
mised position in attempting to cover the controversy.
Again, many of these problems arose in the Chicago debate
negotiations. Three media outlets were directly involved in the
negotiations. Officials at the local public television station,
WTTW, organized the initial negotiation sessions and ulti-
mately provided the broadcast transmission to the other sta-
tions. A radio station with a predominatley black audience,
WBMX, extended one of the first invitations to sponsor a de-
bate and sponsored the second debate in a three-debate series.
Finally, the Chicago Sun-Times invited the candidates to par-
ticipate in a debate on the city budget, an invitation that was
accepted, then rejected, and finally accepted again.43 Each of
these three media companies faced exactly the pressures de-
scribed above. Most obviously, when the candidates temporar-
ily withdrew from the Sun-Times debate, the Sun-Times wrote
Washington and Byrne representatives was agreeing to the Daley proposal that the
agreement that had been reached not be publicized until all of the details were final-
ized. If the agreement had been publicized, it would have been much more difficult
for Daley to back out of it.
43. Demo Clash over Taxes, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 19, 1983, at 89; Withdrawal Threats
Endanger Debates, supra note 37.
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about what occurred and even editorialized about it. Further-
more, the Sun-Times endorsed a candidate, perhaps coinciden-
tally the only of the candidates not to back out of the debate,
State's Attorney Richard Daley.
Similarly, WTTW's leading commentator, John Callaway,
was involved in almost all of the debate negotiations from the
beginning. In fact, the first two negotiating sessions were held
in the WTTW offices. At the end of the first meeting, repre-
sentatives of the candidates decided to keep their tentative
agreements secret. Although there were a number of reporters
waiting outside the negotiation room, no information was dis-
closed. This meant that WTTW alone among all of the media
outlets in the city knew the exact status of the talks. Further-
more, there was strong pressure on the representatives of the
candidates to agree to use Mr. Callaway as moderator of the
debates, a role he had occupied in previous elections. His par-
ticipation in the negotiations made it difficult to argue for the
use of anyone else.
The conflict involving radio station WBMX, however, might
have been the most serious. As a black-oriented radio station,
everyone perceived that it strongly favored Harold Washington
for Mayor. In fact, some of its commentators had long argued
that a black candidate should run for Mayor. Yet, it was politi-
cally difficult for any candidate to refuse WBMX's invitation to
debate without risking offense to the black community. Imag-
ine a situation where a number of different media companies,
including many catering to specialized ethnic audiences, extend
invitations to debate. How can candidates choose among these
offers without jeopardizing support of a crucial constituency?
Further, a controversy erupted during the debate sponsored by
WBMX when there were a number of audience disruptions."
Many other reporters and commentators criticized the way in
which WBMX's moderator handled the situation. Could
WBMX be expected to criticize its political editor who had
served as moderator?
The point is a simple one. There is an inherent conflict of
44. The debate was disrupted when a candidate not invited to participate began
shouting that she was unfairly excluded. Also, the debate was disrupted by the reac-
tions of the strongly pro-Washington audience. Round 2for Mayor, Chi. Tribune, Jan.
24, 1983, at B10. See, e.g., Candidates Haggle over Format Details, supra note 41; Pre-
liminaries Pointing to Fireworks at Debates, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 12, 1983 § 2, at 2, col.
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interest when the media participates in an event and also re-
ports on that event. Isn't it inevitable that reporting, editorial-
izing, and endorsing all will be influenced by the fact that the
media was directly involved in the negotiations? I believe that
the Chicago experience illustrates that the broadcast and print
media should not sponsor debates. Although the print media
were able to sponsor debates even before the new FCC rules,
the involvement of broadcast stations increases the likelihood
that newspapers will now try to sponsor debates. The emer-
gence of radio and television stations as potential sponsors ends
the assumption that only organizations such as the League of
Women Voters should sponsor debates. It is therefore likely
that newspapers will follow the lead of broadcast stations and
attempt to gain the additional publicity and exposure that re-
sults from sponsoring political debates. Thus, the combination
of print and broadcast media outlets insures a dramatic in-
crease in the number of available sponsors for any debate.
A third and final implication of the new FCC rules results
from the ability of stations to broadcast debates without invit-
ing all of the candidates. A candidate can no longer use the
equal time rules to insist on inclusion. Accordingly, a primary
objective of candidates must now be to muster sufficient
strength in the early stage of a campaign to insure they will be
extended the opportunity to participate in the debates. The ex-
clusion of a candidate would reinforce the perception that his
role in the election is insignificant. Thus, the candidate must
garner sufficient initial support so that if he or she is not in-
cluded, the exclusion will appear unfair and may emerge as an
independent campaign issue. This could cause a major change
in campaign spending if candidates make substantial initial ex-
penditures to gain enough support to justify inclusion in the
debates and then use the debates to obtain additional exposure.
In Chicago, few believe that Harold Washington could have
won the Democratic primary without the debates. The debates
permitted Washington's staff to target meager advertising
funds to the time period after the debates and prior to the pri-
mary election.
It might be argued that the FCC rule will make no difference
in this regard because most debates in recent years have in-
volved only the major candidates.45 Certainly, the League of
45. For example, in the 1960, 1976, and 1984 presidential debates, no third party
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Women Voters does not invite every "third party" candidate in
an election to participate in their debates. However, the FCC
rule represents a substantial change because for the first time
the broadcast outlets will decide who will and who will not be
included. Again, this will allow broadcast stations not only to
report the news, but to determine it as well. Furthermore,
under the old FCC rules, stations often felt it necessary to pro-
vide broadcast time to "third party" candidates excluded from
the debates. Because of the strong statutory and administrative
mandate requiring provision of equal time, stations usually re-
sponded favorably to requests for airtime from candidates not
included in the debates. The previous FCC rules were unclear
as to whether stations had a responsibility to provide such time,
and stations erred on the side of insuring equal time. However,
because the new rules expressly approve debates that exclude
some of the candidates, stations have no reason to perceive an
obligation or to provide equal time to candidates not invited to
appear in the debates.
In sum, the result of the new regulations may be decreased
media coverage of "third parties" and candidates without
strong initial support. These are precisely the types of candi-
dates most in need of the free publicity that debates provide.46
Exclusion of these candidates perpetuates the perception that
they have little chance to win and reinforces the dominance of
the two established parties and their front-runners.
IV
Conclusion
Ultimately, a final judgment about the new rules must be
based upon a careful study of their consequences in coming
elections. Nonetheless, at this stage, I find it hard to see much
good coming from the new rules. I see little benefit in allowing
broadcast stations to sponsor debates. They offer nothing that
existing sponsors could not already provide. They do, however,
threaten to disrupt campaigns and make media outlets an in-
dependent factor in elections.
Therefore, an important question must be answered: why, in
candidates were invited to participate. In 1980, John Anderson, running as a third-
party candidate, participated in some of the debates.
46. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 (1975) (importance of third parties); Nich-
olson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 323, 353-72 (discussing third-party candidates).
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light of the significance of political debates and the inevitable
effect of any rule change in altering the existing equilibrium,
did the FCC adopt the new regulations? In its statement in the
Federal Register, the FCC devotes only one sentence to describ-
ing any benifit expected of the rule change. Virtually the en-
tire document focuses on how the new policy can be reconciled
with the legislative history of Section 315. The only justifica-
tion offered for the new rule is an assertion that "exempting
broadcaster sponsored debates should serve to increase the
number of such events, which would ultimately benefit the
public."47 However, there was never a shortage of sponsors
prior to the rule change. No one has ever identified a single
instance in which a debate did not take place because of the
lack of a sponsor. Nor has there been any indication that de-
bate sponsors were obstructing media coverage of their debates.
Prime time broadcasts of debates among candidates have been a
common part of political campaigns.48
Then why were the new rules adopted? Certainly broadcast
stations favored them. They saw an opportunity for free pub-
licity and increased exposure. This pressure from broadcast
companies, together with the FCC's strong disposition toward
deregulation, no doubt combined to produce the new regula-
tions. However, a major change in policy that directly affects
the conduct of all political campaigns should be based on care-
ful analysis. In an era in which broadcast companies can so
greatly influence the outcome of elections, the FCC should
thoroughly consider the effects of its rule changes on the elec-
toral process. What is most remarkable about the new regula-
tions, and perhaps about the FCC's commitment to
deregulation generally, is that there is no indication these con-
sequences were ever considered.
Obviously, it is difficult to identify with precision the forces
that mold voter behavior. There is no way of determining, for
example, whether the controversy over the debates in Chicago
influenced the outcome of the election. What the Chicago ex-
47. Petitions of Henry Geller, supra note 4, at 53,169.
48. I wrote to the Federal Communications Commission asking them if they had
any data supporting their conclusion that the new rules would increase the number of
political debates or that debates have not occurred in past elections because of a
shortage of sponsors. I received a reply letter from Mr. Sheldon Guttman, Associate
General Counsel, dated June 11, 1984, stating that the Commission does not have such
data and "also is not aware of any other organization that might be able to provide
such documentation." (Letter on file with Comm/Ent.)
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perience illustrates, though, is that the availability of many dif-
ferent media outlets as potential debate sponsors significantly
alters the election process. This experience should encourage
the FCC to carefully monitor the effects of its new rules on
campaigns for offices at all levels of government.

